STEAMER FOREST QUEEN,
Jan. 6, 1863.
Dear Brother:
You will have heard of our attack on Vicksburg and failure
to succeed. The place is too strong, and without the co-operation of a large
army coming from the interior it is impracticable. Innumerable batteries
prevent the approach of gun boats to the city or to the first bluff up the
Yazoo, and the only lauding between is on an insular space of low boggy ground,
with innumerable bayous or deep sloughs. I did all that was possible to reach
the main land, but was met at every point by batteries and rifle pits that we
could not pass, and in the absence of Gen. Grant's co-operating force I was
compelled to re-embark my command. My report to Gen. Grant, a copy of which I
sent to Gen. Halleck, who will let you see it, is very full, and more than I
could write to you with propriety. Whatever you or the absent may think, not a
soldier or officer who was present but will admit I pushed the attack as far as
prudence would justify, and that I re-embarked my command in the nick of time,
for a heavy rain set in which would have swamped us and made it impossible to
withdraw artillery and stores. Up to that time I was acting as the right wing
of Gen. Grant's army; but Gen. McClernand has arrived, and we now have a new
organization, — McClernand commanding the whole, and our present force divided
into two commands, or corps d'armee, one of which is commanded by me and one by
Morgan of Cumberland Gap. We are now en route for the Arkansas. Up that river
about 50 miles the enemy is entrenched and has sent down to the Mississippi and
captured two steamboats, conveying to the fleets supplies. Now it is unwise to
leave such a force on our rear and flank, and inasmuch as General Grant is not
prepared to march down to Vicks burg by land, we can attack this post of Arkansas
and maybe reach Little Rock. Success in this quarter will have a good effect on
the main river. But in the end Vicksburg must be reduced, and it is going to be
a hard nut to crack. It is the strongest place I ever saw, both by nature and
art; and so far as we could observe it is defended by a competent force of
artillery, infantry and cavalry. Besides its railroad connections with the
interior give them great advantages. . . .
My orders from Grant were to leave Memphis by the 18th, and
I got off the 20th and I was exactly on time to co-operate with Grant. I did
not know that he was delayed by the breaking of his railroad communications to
his rear. Indeed, I supposed him to be advancing south towards the Yazoo River.
My entire force was 30,000 and was every man I could raise at Memphis and
Helena, and Grant and Halleck were fully advised of my strength and plans. I
suppose you are now fully convinced of the stupendous energy of the South and
their ability to prolong this war indefinitely, but I am further satisfied that
if it lasts 30 years we must fight it out, for the moment the North relaxes its
energies the South will assume the offensive and it is wonderful how well
disciplined and provided they have their men. We found everywhere abundant
supplies, even on the Yazoo, and all along the river we found cattle, and fat
ones, feeding quietly. The country everywhere abounds with corn, and the
soldiers, though coarsely, are well clad. We hear of the manufacture of all
sorts of cloth and munitions of war. The river plantations are mostly
abandoned, and all families, negroes, stock and cotton removed 25 miles back. .
. .
Affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN
SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The
Sherman letters: correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837
to 1891, p. 179-80
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