Showing posts with label Frank Wheaton. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frank Wheaton. Show all posts

Monday, February 26, 2024

Diary of Private Theodore Reichardt, Monday, September 9, 1861

Major Charles H. Tompkins, in company with Col. Wheaton, of the Second Rhode Island Regiment, tried a few shots, without reply.

SOURCE: Theodore Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light Artillery, p. 20

Diary of Private Theodore Reichardt, Tuesday, September 10, 1861

Gov. Sprague, Col. Wheaton, Major Tompkins, and Capt. Reynolds, visited the section on picket. Quiet up to [Monday, September 16.]

SOURCE: Theodore Reichardt, Diary of Battery A, First Regiment Rhode Island Light Artillery, p. 20

Thursday, July 30, 2015

Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg: No. 223. Reports of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U.S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

No. 223.

Reports of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U.S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
Warrenton, Va., August 8, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of the Sixth Corps in the engagements near Gettysburg and since:

This command arrived on the field of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2, after a march of more than 30 miles.

Wheaton's and Eustis' brigades, of the third Division, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Wheaton, and Bartlett's brigade, of Wright's division, went into action about 5 p.m. on the left center, between divisions of the Fifth Corps, and assisted in repulsing the assault of the enemy. Russell's and Torbert's brigades, of Wright's division, were held in reserve that night. Neill's brigade, of Howe's division, was sent to the right of the line, reporting to Major-General Slocum, and Grant's brigade, of the same division, was posted on the extreme left of the general line. Shaler's brigade, of Wheaton's division, was held in reserve near the left center. The artillery of the corps was placed under the orders of the chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac.

On the next morning and subsequently the following changes were made in the positions stated above: Russell's brigade was sent to the extreme left of the line, General Wright taking command of the troops of this corps there stationed. Subsequently it was returned to the left center, and on the following day it was placed in position, relieving a brigade of the Fifth Corps. Torbert's brigade was sent to the center, reporting to Major-General Newton, and remained in position until the morning of the 5th. Eustis' brigade was sent to the right center, also reporting to Major-General Newton. Shaler's brigade was also ordered to the left, and then to the right, and subsequently returned to the left center, and held in reserve.

During these movements the troops were more or less exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, but, with the exception of the evening of July 2, they were at no time seriously engaged.

On July 5, Wright's division, supported by the rest of my command, was sent forward to determine the position of the enemy, who was discovered to be in retreat through Fairfield in the direction of Hagerstown. The rear of the column was shelled for a short time in the morning, and in the evening a brisk artillery fire was opened upon his wagon trains in the vicinity of Fairfield, while the infantry pursued the rear guard, which was posted to protect the passage of the trains; 250 prisoners were captured during the day.

On the following day the enemy continued his retreat through the mountain pass, with a strong rear guard well posted, with artillery in position.
During the night the corps marched to Emmitsburg, with the exception of Neill's brigade, which was detached and sent in pursuit of the retreating column. From Emmitsburg I marched by way of Hamburg to Middletown, and thence to Boonsborough, Md.

On July 11, the enemy was posted near Funkstown, Md., and the corps moved up and took position, after crossing Beaver Creek. The Vermont Brigade (Grant's, of the Second Division) were deployed as skirmishers, covering a front of over 2 miles, and during the afternoon repulsed three successive attacks made in line of battle. The remarkable conduct of the brigade on this occasion deserves high praise.

On July 13, my command was placed in the general line of battle in the vicinity of Hagerstown, connecting with the Eleventh Corps on the right and the Fifth Corps on the left, and continued in this position, with occasional sharp skirmishing, until the enemy retired from the front and during the night recrossed the Potomac. He was closely followed to the river by Wright's division and the rest of the command.

On the day following the retreat of the enemy, I moved by way of Boonsborough and Middletown to Berlin, and crossed the river in rear of the army, and continued my march by way of Union, Rectortown, and Barbee's Cross-Roads to Manassas Gap, and thence by way of Barbee's Cross-Roads to Warrenton.

During the operations herein reported, the conduct of the troops was admirable. The marches were very severe, and the hardships undergone were greater than in any previous campaign.
The casualties of the corps were as follows.* A nominal list has been already forwarded.

Very respectfully,
 JOHN SEDGWICK,
 Major-General, Commanding Sixth Army Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 182.
_______________

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
September 12, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 227, Paragraph III, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, August 24, 1863, I respectfully report that no guns were captured by or captured from my command during the recent operations in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

I am, general, very respectfully,

 JOHN SEDGWICK,
 Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.
_______________

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
October 8, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully report that the number of Confederates buried by this command at Gettysburg was 4 officers and 91 enlisted men; total, 95.

I am, general, very respectfully,
JOHN SEDGWICK,
Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43),  p. 663-4; George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 138-42

Saturday, July 11, 2015

Official Reports of the Chancellorsville Campaign, April 27-May 6, 1863: No. 206. – Report of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.


No. 206.

Report of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS, May 15, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations on the left:

On Tuesday, the 28th ultimo, in compliance with the orders of the commanding general, received that morning, the Sixth Corps moved to the vicinity of Franklin's crossing, near the mouth of Deep Run; the First Corps, Major-General Reynolds, to a position about 1 mile farther down the river, and the Third Corps, Major-General Sickles, took position slightly to the rear and between the positions of the First and Sixth Corps. All the troops encamped that night behind the heights, without fires, and concealed from the observation of the enemy. During the night the pontoons were carried to the river by hand. At the upper crossing, and shortly before daylight, Brooks' division, of the Sixth Corps, crossed in the boats, Russell's brigade taking the lead, and receiving the fire of the enemy's pickets and reserves. The enemy's rifle-pits were immediately occupied, and three bridges were rapidly laid, under the direction of Brigadier-General Benham.

At Reynolds' crossing, 1 mile farther down, the passage was delayed by a severe fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, but was at length gallantly accomplished, General Wadsworth crossing with a portion of his division in the boats, and driving the enemy from their rifle-pits.

During the day, Wednesday, April 29, the command was held in readiness to cross, while the enemy was rapidly intrenching on his entire front, and occasionally shelling Reynolds' position, on the left.

On Thursday, the 30th, Sickles' corps was detached from my command, and ordered to the United States Ford, and during the night one of the bridges at the upper and one at the lower crossing were taken up, under orders from headquarters, and sent to Banks' Ford.

On Friday, May 1, at 5 p.m., an order was received from the commanding general to make a demonstration in force at 1 o'clock that same day; to let it be as severe as possible without being an attack; to assume a threatening attitude, and maintain it until further orders. It was already some hours after the time fixed for the movement, but the last clause of the order, as stated here, determined me to execute it without delay. Reynolds' corps was accordingly displayed in force; General Newton was directed to send one division of the Sixth Corps to Reynolds' support, to cover his bridges in case of an attack, and the Light Brigade across at the upper bridges, to support General Brooks, who was to display his force as if for advance. When these movements had been executed, an order was received countermanding the order for the demonstration.

The following day, Saturday, May 2, Reynolds' corps was withdrawn from my command, and ordered to proceed to headquarters of the army, at or near Chancellorsville, one division, General Wheaton's, of the Sixth Corps, being sent by General Newton to cover his crossing and take up his bridge. I was also ordered to take up all the bridges at Franklin's crossing and below before daylight. This order was received at 5.25 a.m., after daylight, and could not, of course, be executed without attracting the observation of the enemy, and leaving him free to proceed against the forces under General Hooker.

At 6.30 p.m. the order to pursue the enemy by the Bowling Green road was repeated, and my command was immediately put under arms and advanced upon the right, driving the enemy from the Bowling Green road and pushing him back to the woods. That night at 11 o'clock I received an order, dated 10.10 p.m., directing me to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg immediately upon receipt of the order, and move in the direction of Chancellorsville until I connected with the major-general commanding; to attack and destroy any force on the road, and be in the vicinity of the general at daylight.

I had been informed repeatedly by Major-General Butterfield, chief of staff, that the force in front of me was very small, and the whole tenor of his many dispatches would have created the impression that the enemy had abandoned my front and retired from the city and its defenses had there not been more tangible evidence than the dispatches in question that the chief of staff was misinformed.

The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with my entire command on the south side of the river, ready to pursue by the Bowling Green road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg, where no bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight. I commenced, therefore, to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg, on the Bowling Green road, General Newton taking the advance, followed by the Light Brigade and Howe's division. A sharp skirmish commenced as the head of the column moved from the immediate vicinity of the bridges, and continued all the way to the town, the enemy falling slowly back. At the same time, a sudden attack was made upon the pickets in front of the Bernard house. When the head of the column entered the town, four regiments from Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward against the rifle pits, and advanced within 20 yards of the enemy's works, when they received a sudden and destructive fire. An immediate assault was made, but repulsed by the fire of the rifle-pits and the batteries on the heights. It was evident that the enemy's line of works was occupied in considerable force, and that his right, as it appeared from reports from General Brooks, extended beyond my left.

It was now daylight, and batteries were placed in position to shell the enemy until the troops could be formed for another attack.

General Gibbon was ordered to cross the river as soon as the bridge opposite the Lacy house was completed, and about 7 o'clock proceeded to take position on my right. General Howe was directed to move on the left of Hazel Run, to turn the enemy's right. Upon advancing as directed, he found that the works in his front were occupied, and that the character of the stream between his command and that of General Newton's prevented any movement of his division to the right. General Gibbon, upon moving forward to turn the left of the enemy, was checked by the canal and compelled to halt. Nothing remained but to carry the works by direct assault.

Two storming columns were formed, composed as follows:

Right column, commanded by Col. George C. Spear, who fell while gallantly leading it: The Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Dawson, and the Forty-third New York, Colonel Baker. This column was supported by the Sixty-seventh New York (First Long Island), Colonel Cross, and the Eighty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Bassett, under command of Colonel Shaler.

Left column: The Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Johns, who fell, severely wounded in the assault, and the Thirty-sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh.

Line of battle, Colonel Burnham: The Fifth Wisconsin, Colonel Allen, as skirmishers; Sixth Maine, Lieutenant-Colonel Harris; Thirty-first New York, Colonel Jones, and the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Ely, this latter regiment volunteering.

The columns moved on the Plank road and to the right of it directly up the heights. The line of battle advanced on the double-quick to the left of the Plank road against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a shot until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works. In the meantime the storming columns had pressed forward to the crest, and carried the works in the rear of the rifle-pits, capturing the guns and many prisoners. These movements were gallantly executed under a most destructive fire.

In the meantime Howe advanced rapidly on the left of Hazel Run, in three columns of assault, and forced the enemy from the crest in front, capturing five guns. The entire corps was at once put in motion and moved in pursuit. Considerable resistance was made on the next series of heights, but the position was carried without halting. A section of horse artillery on our right occupied every successive crest upon our line of march, and much annoyed our advance.

At Salem Chapel the enemy were re-enforced by a brigade from Banks' Ford and by troops from the direction of Chancellorsville, and made a determined resistance. Brooks' division formed rapidly across the road and Newton's upon his right, and advanced upon the woods, which were strongly held by the enemy. After a sharp and prolonged contest, we gained the heights, but were met by fresh troops pouring in upon the flank of the advanced portion of the line. For a short time the crest was held by our troops with obstinate resistance, but at length the line was forced slowly back through the woods. The advance of the enemy is checked by the splendid firing of our batteries, Williston's, Rigby's, and Parsons'. Wheaton still holds his position on the right, gallantly fighting. On the left the troops are rapidly reformed, and, after a short interval, again advance upon the woods. The enemy is once more forced back in much confusion on our right, but steadily resisting on the left.

This was the condition of things when night put an end to the battle. The troops rested on their arms until morning.

During the night the enemy were re-enforcing heavily, and our wounded, as far as was practicable, were collected and sent to Fredericksburg.

The following morning, at an early hour, I was informed that a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, coming from the direction of Richmond, had occupied the heights of Fredericksburg, cutting off my communications with the town. Expecting a movement of this kind, I had already formed Howe's division in line of battle to the rear. General Howe promptly extended his left to the river, and admirably checked an effort of the enemy to cut us off from Banks' Ford, where a pontoon bridge had been laid the day previous. In this affair he captured 200 prisoners and a battle-flag.

While these things were occurring on my left, I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding, informing me that he had contracted his lines; that I must look well to the safety of my corps, preserve my communications with Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, and suggesting that I fall back upon the former place, or recross, in preference, at Banks' Ford, where I could more readily communicate with the main body. To fall back upon Fredericksburg was out of the question. To adopt the other alternative, except under cover of night, was equally so, for the enemy still maintained his position on Salem Heights, and was threatening my flank and rear from the direction of Fredericksburg. My line was formed with the left resting on the river, about midway between Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, thence extending slightly beyond the Plank road, when it turned at right angles to the right, following the direction of the Plank road for a mile, and then again turning to the right at right angles, and recrossing the Plank road in front of Salem Heights, my right resting where it had been placed in the engagement of the previous evening. A line of battle of such length was necessarily weak, yet to contract it would inevitably provoke immediate attack from vastly superior forces.

Batteries were skillfully posted by Colonel Tompkins, chief of artillery, to maintain the weaker points, and rendered invaluable service.

Thus, fronting in three directions, I was compelled to await attack, determined to hold the position until dark and then fall back upon Banks' Ford. A dispatch from the major-general commanding had informed me that he could not relieve me, as he was in position in which he hoped to be attacked, and that he was too far away to direct my operations.

Subsequent dispatches directed me to hold a position on the right bank of the river until the following morning. During the day there was more or less skirmishing on the whole front, and in the evening a most determined attack was made upon Howe's line, for the purpose of cutting our communication with the river, and at the same time Brooks was attacked farther toward the right. The attack on Brooks was readily repulsed, chiefly by the skirmish line and the firing by the battery of McCartney's (First Massachusetts) battery. That on Howe was of a more determined character, being made en échelon of battalions and in columns. It was gallantly resisted by our infantry by a counter charge, while the artillery of the division played with fearful effect upon their advance. At length our line was forced back upon the left, and General Howe directed his right to retire to a less advanced position. The movement was quietly executed, the enemy still pressing fiercely on his front.

Wheaton's brigade and two regiments of the Light Brigade had been sent from the extreme right to his support, and Butler's battery (G, Second U.S. Artillery) was sent rapidly by a road through the wood to his rear. The division reformed promptly, the batteries keeping up a most effective fire upon the wood. The advance of the enemy was checked, his troops were scattered and driven back with fearful loss, and the new position was easily maintained until nightfall. Several hundred prisoners, including 1 general officer and many others of rank, and 3 battle-flags, were captured from the enemy in this engagement.

As soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks' divisions, with the Light Brigade, fell rapidly back upon Banks' Ford, and took position on the heights in that neighborhood and in the rifle-pits. When these movements were completed, Howe was directed to fall back, and at once abandoned his position and moved to the river, taking position on Newton's right.

On Tuesday, the 5th, at 2 a.m., I received the order of the commanding general to withdraw from my position, cross the river, take up the bridge, and cover the ford. The order was immediately executed, the enemy meanwhile shelling the bridges from commanding positions above us, on the river. When the last of the column was on the bridge, I received a dispatch from the commanding general countermanding the order to withdraw. My command was on the left bank it could not recross before daylight, and must do it then, if at all, in face of the enemy, whose batteries completely commanded the bridges. I accordingly went into camp in the vicinity of the ford, sending an adequate force to guard the river and watch the ford.

The losses of the Sixth Corps in these operations were 4,925 killed, wounded, and missing.*  We captured from the enemy, according to the best information we could obtain, 5 battle-flags, 15 pieces of artillery – 9 of which were brought off, the others falling into the hands of the enemy upon the subsequent reoccupation of Fredericksburg by his forces-and 1,400 prisoners, including many officers of rank. No material of any kind belonging to the corps fell into the hands of the enemy except several wagons and a forge that were passing through Fredericksburg at the time of its reoccupation by his forces.

I must add, in closing, that the conduct of the troops from the first crossing of the river until our return to Banks' Ford was such as to merit my heartiest approbation.

To Major-General Newton, commanding Third Division, and Brigadier-General Brooks, commanding First Division, I am indebted for excellent counsel and for the gallant and spirited manner in which they carried out their orders.

To Brigadier-General Howe, for his determined bravery in resisting repeated charges of an overwhelming force of the enemy, the safety of the command was greatly indebted.

To General Gibbon I am indebted for his effective support in the engagement of Sunday morning.

The gallant conduct of Colonel Burnham, in leading the Light Brigade to the assault on the rifle-pits in rear of Fredericksburg, is worthy of the highest admiration.

It is no disparagement to the other regiments of the corps to say that the steadiness and valor of the Sixth Maine, Fifth Wisconsin, Seventh Massachusetts, and the Vermont Brigade could not be excelled.

The skill and personal gallantry of Brigadier-Generals Bartlett, Wheaton, Russell, and Neill, Colonels Grant, Shaler, William H. Browne, Thirty-sixth New York, and H. W. Brown, Third New Jersey, displayed in the management of their respective brigades, deserve the special notice of the commanding general.

Colonel Browne, of the Thirty-sixth New York, I regret to say, was severely wounded in the action of Sunday afternoon, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Col. H. L. Eustis, who is specially mentioned by his division commander for gallant service.

Colonel Brown, of the New Jersey Brigade, was also wounded, and the command of the brigade passed to Colonel Buck, Second New Jersey. He, too, fell, wounded, and the command devolved on Colonel Penrose, Fifteenth New Jersey. Both these officers performed their duties with admirable coolness.

I desire also to call the special attention of the commanding general to the officers named in connection with the assault on the heights of Fredericksburg.

For a further mention of officers who deserve his notice, I respectfully refer to the reports of division commanders, herewith transmitted.

To the following-named officers of my staff I am indebted for prompt and efficient assistance rendered at all times during the operations I have reported, and often under circumstances of exceeding danger and confusion; Lieut. Col. M. T. McMahon, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff'; Col. C. H. Tompkins, chief of artillery; Lieut. Col. J. Ford Kent, inspector-general, slightly wounded in the action of Sunday morning; Maj. C. A. Whittier, aide-de-camp; Maj. T. W. Hyde, provost-marshal and acting aide-de-camp, Maj. H. H. Janeway, acting aide-de-camp; Capts. R. F. Halsted and H. C. Pratt, aides-de-camp; Lieut. J. N. Andrews, commissary of musters and acting aide-de-camp, and Lieut. H. W. Farrar, acting aide-de-camp, taken prisoner while carrying an important order.

The management of the artillery, under Colonel Tompkins, was singularly effective.

The difficult details of the commissary and quartermaster's departments were excellently conducted by Lieut. Col. C.W. Tolles, chief quartermaster, and Capt. J. K. Scofield, chief commissary. Those officers are entitled to much credit.

I notice with particular approbation the arrangements made for the care and prompt removal of the wounded by Surg. Charles O'Leary, medical director of the corps, and Surg. Charles F. Crehore, medical inspector. These arrangements were carried into effect by Capt. W. H. Robinson, chief of ambulance corps.

I respectfully request that the regiments and batteries of the corps be permitted to inscribe “Fredericksburg” and “Salem Heights” on their colors. It is an honor they have bravely earned.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN SEDGWICK,
Major-General, Commanding Sixth Army Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.
_______________

* But see revised statement, pp. 172, 189

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 25, Part 1 (Serial No. 39), p. 557-62; George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 93-108, which dates this report as May 7, 1863.

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, December 13, 1864

December 13, 1864

As the Rebels have known the fact for some time, and as the newspapers have hinted at it in unmistakable terms, I conceive there is no impropriety in my saying that we have now with us the 6th Corps once again. A week ago Sunday night the first division came from City Point on the cars, having come straight from the neighborhood of Winchester by car and boat. The next morning we were treated to the sight of the familiar red crosses, and soon General Wheaton rode up, to see the General and report. . . . Very loath were the Sixth Corps bucks to leave the valley (where they had plenty of sheep and chickens and victories, and no fighting except in the regular battles), and come to a place with which they only connected more or less fighting, day and night (rather more than less), much dust, heat, and drought, and no particular victories. However, they find things better now, and will doubtless get contented in time. What must have gratified them was that they relieved Crawford's division of the 5th Corps, on the line, and took possession of their very nice log huts, which had been carefully constructed uniformly in all the brigades. Crawford's people by no means saw the thing in the same light. They took down their canvas roofs and rolled them up with dudgeon, and marched off to take a temporary camp, previous to the Weldon road expedition. I rode along the breastworks as the red crosses marched into the deserted camps, and observed the aspect of grim satisfaction with which the new comers went about, looking into the abandoned huts. The luxurious Crawford had his nice log cabin taken down and carted to his new locality. “However,” said Wheaton, “I slept in Crawford's kitchen, and that was good enough for me.” On Tuesday came the 3d division, also with a new commander, for brave General Ricketts lies at Washington, still suffering from his wound; and General Seymour, he who was taken the second day of the Wilderness, has the command. Seymour is a fiery and irrepressible sort of party, and enraged the inhabitants of Charlottesville beyond measure. When they told him they had had most extraordinary victories over Grant, he made them a speech, in which he said it didn't make any sort of difference how many victories they had, it wouldn't do them any sort of good; that in every battle we killed off a good many of them, and that we intended to keep piling up men indefinitely, until they knocked under, or were all shot! This enraged them much, and they invited him to air himself for sixteen miles on foot, after it.  . . . It was only last Monday that the 2d division got here, under Getty, and with it came General Wright, commanding the corps. Good General Wright, though always pleasant, is, I think rather in low spirits. He has had poor luck, on numerous occasions, and it culminated at Cedar Creek, where he chanced to have command of the army when it was surprised. He had rallied it, when Sheridan arrived on the field; but of course Sheridan had the credit of the victory, and indeed he deserved it. All the officers say that Wright made prodigious exertions and rode along all parts of the line in the hottest fire.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 298-300

Saturday, February 7, 2015

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Meade, February 28, 1865

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, February 28, 1865.

After writing to you yesterday I saw the Secretary, who was as usual very kind. He apologized for ordering me away when he did, and said he had forgotten dear Sergeant's sickness, and some telegrams coming from Ord he did not like, he thought, in Grant's absence, I had better be there. He wanted me to stay in Washington over night, but I declined, when he directed a special steamer to be got ready to take me at seven in the evening. From the Department I went to the Capitol, where I saw Mr. Cowan and Judge Harris. They both said they would see that the same number of copies of the proceedings of the court of inquiry were ordered to be printed as had been ordered of the committee's report.

I had a pleasant journey, there being no one on board but General Wheaton and myself. We reached City Point at 1 P. M. to-day. I spent two hours with General Grant, reaching my headquarters about half-past four this afternoon.

I find we have not been attacked, and Petersburg has not been evacuated, although I should judge there had been a stampede ever since I left, and that both contingencies had been expected. It has been raining, I am told, nearly all the time I have been absent, and the roads are in an awful condition.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 265

Monday, January 5, 2015

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, June 24, 1864

It is praise not to be pitched into by the Great Peppery: and he is very kind to me. To be sure, I watch him, as one would a big trout on a small hook, and those who don't, catch volleys at all hours! Poor Biddle, for instance, an excellent, bettyish sort of man, with no fragment of tact, when the General is full of anxiety for something that is not going right, is sure to come in, in his stuttering way, with “Ah, aw, hem, aw, General, they are going to pitch camp in a very sandy, bad place, sir; you will not be at all comfortable, and there is a nice grassy —” “Major Bid dle!!!” — and then follows the volley. Sometimes it is very effective to contradict the General, provided you stick to it and are successful. I came in last night, feeling cross and not at all caring for commanders of armies or other great ones of this earth. “Well, Lyman, you're back, are you?” “Yes, sir: I reported that the enemy were moving along our rear, but they got no further than —” “Rear! not at all! they were moving along the front.” “No, sir, they were not, they were moving along our rear.” “What do you mean by that? There is Russell, and there is Ricketts, and here is Wheaton; now of course that's your front.” “Russell isn't in such a position, sir, nor Wheaton either. They face so (dabs with a pencil), so that is our rear and can't be anything else.” Whereupon the good chief graciously said no more. I do not know that he ever said anything pleasant about me except the day after the Wilderness battles, when I heard Hancock say that “Colonel Lyman had been useful to him, the day before.” To which the General replied: “Yes, Lyman is a clearheaded man.” I have heard him volunteer several favorable things about Captain Sanders; also he has remarked that Old Rosey (my tent-mate) was good at finding roads; and that is pretty much all of his praises, whereof no man is more sparing. By the way, old Rosey has his commission as captain. One thing I do not like — it is serious — and that is, that three years of bitter experience have failed to show our home people that, to an army on active campaign (or rather furious campaign), there must be supplied a constant stream of fresh men — by thousands. What do we see? Everyone trying to persuade himself that his town has furnished its “quota.” But where are they? We have large armies, but nothing compared with the paper statements. No! The few produced by drafts in good part run away; so too many of the “volunteers” — miserable fellows bought with money. None are shot — that is unmerciful — but the Powers that Be will let brave, high-toned men, who scorn to shirk their duty, be torn with canister and swept away with musketry, and that is inevitable.

This morning appeared General Grant with two French officers, who since have taken up their quarters with us and mess with us. They are two artillery officers, the elder a Colonel de Chanal, the other a Captain Guzman, both sent as a commission to observe the progress of the campaign. The Colonel is a perfect specimen of an old Frenchman, who has spent most of his life in provincial garrisons, in the study of all sorts of things, from antiquities down to rifled projectiles. He has those extraordinary, nervous legs, which only middle-aged Frenchmen can get, and is full of various anecdotes. Many years he has lived in Toulouse. The other is young and little and looks like a black-eyed and much astonished grasshopper. He is very bright, speaks several languages, and was on the Chinese expedition. General Grant staid some time in council, and took dinner with us. I was amused at him, for, the day being warm, he began taking off his coat before he got to the tent; and by the time he had said, “How are you, Meade?” he was in his shirt-sleeves, in which state he remained till dinner-time. He attempted no foreign conversation with the Gauls, simply observing; “If I could have turned the class the other end to, I should have graduated at West Point, very high in French!”

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 176-8

Saturday, January 3, 2015

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, June 23, 1864

June 23, 1864

All were up at an early hour and ready for an advance, which had been ordered. On the right, towards the Gregory house, we were already against them, and I suppose my friend there, Major Crow, had seen us under more hostile circumstances.  . . . By 4.30 General Meade started for General Wright's Headquarters at the Williams house, where he ordered me to stay, when he left at seven.  . . . I rode about with General Wright, who visited his line, which was not straight or facing properly. That's a chronic trouble in lines in the woods. Indeed there are several chronic troubles. The divisions have lost connection; they cannot cover the ground designated, their wing is in the air, their skirmish line has lost its direction, etc., etc. Then General Meade gets mad with the delay. The commanders say they do as well as they can, etc. Well, Ricketts ran one way and Russell another; and then the 2d Corps — how did that run? and were the skirmishers so placed as to face ours? and what would General Birney do about it? How long was the line? could it advance in a given direction, and, if so, how? All of which is natural with a good many thousand men in position in a dense wood, which nobody knows much about. All this while the men went to sleep or made coffee; profoundly indifferent to the perplexities of their generals; that was what generals were paid for. When General Wright had looked a great deal at his line, and a great deal more at his pocket compass, he rode forth on the left to look at the pickets, who were taking life easy like other privates. They had put up sun-shades with shelter-tents and branches, and were taking the heat coolly. . . .

About this time a Vermont captain (bless his soul!) went and actually did something saucy and audacious. With eighty sharpshooters he pushed out boldly, drove in a lot of cavalry, and went a mile and a quarter to the railroad, which he held, and came back in person to report, bringing a piece of the telegraph wire.  . . . Some time in the morning, I don't exactly know when, the signal officers reported a large force, say two divisions, marching out from the town, along the railroad, whereof we heard more anon. At noon there still had been no advance, and General Wright went to General Birney to arrange one. There was General Meade, not much content with the whole affair. They all pow-wowed a while, and so we rode back again, through the dreary woods, through which fires had run. It was after two when we returned. Now then — at last — all together — skirmishers forward! And away they go, steadily. Oh, yes! but Rebs are not people who let you sit about all the day and do just as you like; remember that always, if nothing else. There are shots away out by the railroad — so faint that you can scarce hear them. In comes a warm sharpshooter: “They are advancing rapidly and have driven the working party from the railroad.” Here come the two divisions, therefore, or whatever they are. “Stop the advance,” orders General Wright. “General Wheaton, strengthen that skirmish line and tell them to hold on." The remainder of Wheaton's division is formed on the flank, and begins making a breastwork; more troops are sent for. The fire of the skirmishers now draws nearer and gets distinct; but, when the reinforcement arrives, they make a stout stand, and hold them.  . . . All the while the telegraph is going: “Don't let 'em dance round you, pitch into them!” suggests General Meade (not in those exact words). “Don't know about that — very easy to say — will see about it,” replies the cautious W.; etc., etc. Pretty soon the cavalry comes piling in across the Aiken oat-field; they don't hold too long, you may be certain. This exposes the flank of the picket line, which continues to shoot valiantly. In a little while more, a division officer of the day gallops in and says they have broken his skirmishers and are advancing in line of battle. But the Rebels did not try an approach through the open oat-field: bullets would be too thick there; so they pushed through the woods in our rear. I could hear them whooping and ki-yi-ing, in their peculiar way. I felt uncomfortable, I assure you. It was now towards sunset. Our position was right in the end of the loop, where we should get every bullet from two sides, in event of an attack. General Grant, of the Vermont Brigade, walked up and said, in his quiet way: “Do you propose to keep your Headquarters here?” “Why not?” says Ricketts. “Because, when the volleys begin, nothing can live here.” To which Ricketts replied, “Ah?” as if someone had remarked it was a charming evening, or the like. I felt very like addressing similar arguments to General Wright, but pride stood in the way, and I would have let a good many volleys come before I would have given my valuable advice. A column of attack was now formed by us, during which the enemy pushed in their skirmishers and the bullets began to slash among the trees most spitefully; for they were close to; whereat Wright (sensible man!) vouchsafed to move on one side some seventy yards, where we only got accidental shots. And what do you think? It was too dark now for us to attack, and the Rebs did not — and so, domino, after all my tremendous description! Worse than a newspaper isn't it? I was quite enraged to be so scared for no grand result.1
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1 “I look on June 22d and 23d as the two most discreditable days to this army that I ever saw! There was everywhere, high and low, feebleness, confusion, poor judgment. The only person who kept his plans and judgment clear was General Meade, himself. On this particular occasion Wright showed himself totally unfit to command a corps.” — Lyman's Journal.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 173-6

Monday, November 24, 2014

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, May 15, 1864 – 10 p.m.

Headquarters Army Of Potomac
10 P.M. Sunday, May 15, 1864

Well, to be more or less under fire, for six days out of seven, is not very good for the nerves, or very pleasant. But now that there is a quiet day, I thought I would make a beginning of describing to you the sad, bloody work we have been at. I will write enough to make a letter and so go on in future letters, only writing what can now be of no importance to the enemy. The morning of Wednesday the 4th of May (or rather the night, for we were up by starlight) was clear and warm. By daylight we had our breakfast, and all was in a hurry with breaking up our winter camp. To think of it to-night makes it seem a half-year ago; but it is only eleven days. About 5.30 A.M. we turned our backs on what had been our little village for six months. Already the whole army had been some hours in motion. The 5th Corps, followed by the 6th, was to cross at Germanna Ford, and march towards the Orange pike. The 2d Corps to march on Chancellorsville, crossing at Ely's Ford; each corps was preceded by a division of cavalry, to picket the roads and scour the country. The main wagon-train rested on the north side at Richardsville. So you see the first steps were much like the Mine Run campaign. I have drawn a little map to help you in understanding; not very exact in proportions, but still enough so.



The roads were hard and excellent, full of waggons and black with troops; as we got past Stevensburg and went through a more wooded country, there were the little green leaves just opening, and purple violets, in great plenty, by the wayside. As the sun got fairly up, it grew much warmer, as one could see by the extra blankets and overcoats that our men threw away, whenever they halted. By 8 A.M. we drew near the Ford, and halted at a familiar spot, where we had our camp on the Mine Run campaign. How bitterly cold it was then! And now there was green grass all about, and wild flowers. Griffin's division was already over, and the others were following steadily on. At 9.30 we went over ourselves, and, for a long time, I sat on the high bank, some seventy feet above the river, watching the steady stream of men and cannon and trains pouring over the pontoons. It was towards six in the evening before the last were across; and then one bridge was left for Burnside to cross by; for he was marching in all haste, from Rappahannock station. Meantime the head of the 5th Corps had reached the Orange pike, and that of the 2d, Chancellorsville. The Headquarters pitched their now reduced tents on the bank of the river that night, and I went down and took a slight bath in the stream, by way of celebrating our advance. General Grant came up betimes in the morning and had his tents near ours. He has several very sensible officers on his Staff, and several very foolish ones, who talked and laughed flippantly about Lee and his army. But they have changed their note now, and you hear no more of their facetiousness. The more experienced officers were sober, like men who knew what work was ahead. Our first grief was a ludicrous one. Our cook, a small Gaul, had mysteriously disappeared, and all we had left to cook for us was a waiter lad, who however rose with the occasion and was very conspicuous for activity. It turned out after, that the cook was arrested as a suspicious person, despite his violent protestations. . . .

We were off betimes the next morning (Thursday, May 5th), and about 7 o'clock got to the junction of the plank and pike, the troops meantime marching past us, as we stood waiting news from the front. Presently Griffin (5th Corps), who was two miles out on the pike (going west), reported the enemy in his front; while the cavalry, thrown out on the plank road, towards Parker's Store, sent to say that the Rebel infantry were marching down in force, driving them in. General Wright's division of the 6th Corps was turned off the Germanna plank to the right and ordered to march down the cross-road you see on the map, leading to the pike; and he and Griffin were directed to press the enemy and try to make a junction by their wings. At 10.40 A.M. General Getty's division (6th Corps) was sent to hold the Orange plank road. It marched down the Germanna plank and took the little cross-road where the dotted line is, and got to the Orange plank just in time to stop the advance of A. P. Hill's Corps. Meantime the rest of the 5th Corps was ordered into position on the left of, or in support of, General Griffin, about parallel to the most westerly dotted line, crossing the pike. Word was sent to 2d Corps, near Chancellorsville, that the Rebels were moving on us, and ordering Hancock to at once bring his men across to the Brock road and so take position on the left in support of General Getty. At noon, I was sent to General Getty, to tell him the disposition of the various troops and to direct him to feel along to his right, and find roads to communicate with the left of the 5th Corps, where, you will see, there was a considerable gap. Our Headquarters were on a piney knoll near the join of the Germanna plank and the pike. I rode down the dotted cross-road and came immediately on General Eustis, just putting his brigade into the woods, on Getty's right. I stopped and directed him to throw out well to the right and to try to find Crawford, or a road to him.

Here it is proper to say something of the nature of this country, whereof I have already spoken somewhat during Mine Run times. A very large part of this region, extending east and west along the plank and pike, and the south, nearly to Spotsylvania, is called “The Wilderness,” a most appropriate term — a land of an exhausted, sandy soil, supporting a more or less dense growth of pine or of oak. There are some cleared spaces, especially near Germanna plank, where our Headquarters are marked. The very worst of it is parallel with Orange plank and upper part of the Brock road. Here it is mostly a low, continuous, thick growth of small saplings, fifteen to thirty feet high and seldom larger than one's arm. The half-grown leaves added to the natural obscurity, and there were many places where a line of troops could with difficulty be seen at fifty yards. This was the terrain on which we were called to manoeuvre a great army. I found General Getty at the plank road (a spot I shall remember for some years) and gave him instructions. He told me the whole of Hill's Corps was in his front and the skirmishers only 300 yards from us. For all I could see they might have been in Florida, but the occasional wounded men who limped by, and the sorry spectacle of two or three dead, wrapped in their blankets, showed that some fighting had already taken place. I got back and reported a little before one o'clock, and had scarcely got there when B-r-r-r-r torang went the musketry, in front of Griffin and of Wright, which for the next hour and a half was continuous — not by volley, for that is impossible in such woods; but a continuous crackle, now swelling and now abating, and interspersed with occasional cannon. Very soon the ambulances began to go forward for their mournful freight. A little before two, I was sent with an order to a cavalry regiment, close by. The pike was a sad spectacle indeed; it was really obstructed with trains of ambulances and with the wounded on foot; all had the same question, over and over again; “How far to the 5th Corps’ hospital? As I returned, I saw, coming towards me, a mounted officer — his face was covered with blood and he was kept in the saddle only by an officer who rode beside him and his servant who walked on the other side. “Hullo, Lyman!” he cried, in a wild way that showed he was wandering; “here I am; hurt a little; not much; I am going to lie down a few minutes, and then I am going back again! Oh, you ought to have seen how we drove ’em — I had the first line!” It was my classmate, Colonel Hayes, of the 18th Massachusetts; as fearless a soldier as ever went into action. There we were, three of us together, for the officer who supported him was Dr. Dalton. Three classmates together, down in the Virginia Wilderness, and a great fight going on in front. I was afraid Hayes was mortally hurt, but I am told since, he will recover. I trust so.

Gradually the musketry died away; and, at a quarter before three, General Griffin rode up — his face was stern and flushed, as it well might be. He said he had attacked and driven Ewell's troops three quarters of a mile, but that Wright had made no join on his right and Wadsworth had been forced back on his left, so that with both flanks exposed he had been obliged to fall back to his former position.1  Meantime we got word that the head of Hancock's column had moved up the Brock road and made a junction with Getty. At 3.15 I was sent with an order to General Getty to attack at once, and to explain to him that Hancock would join also. He is a cool man, is Getty, quite a wonder; as I saw then and after. “Go to General Eustis and General Wheaton,” he said to his aides, “and tell them to prepare to advance at once.” And so we were getting into it! And everybody had been ordered up, including Burnside, who had crossed that very morning at Germanna Ford. General Grant had his station with us (or we with him); there he took his seat on the grass, and smoked his briarwood pipe, looking sleepy and stern and indifferent. His face, however, may wear a most pleasing smile, and I believe he is a thoroughly amiable man. That he believes in his star and takes a bright view of things is evident. At 4.15 P.M. General Meade ordered me to take some orderlies, go to General Hancock (whose musketry we could now hear on the left) and send him back reports, staying there till dark. Delightful! At the crossing of the dotted cross-road with the plank sat Hancock, on his fine horse — the preux chevalier of this campaign — a glorious soldier, indeed! The musketry was crashing in the woods in our front, and stray balls — too many to be pleasant — were coming about. It's all very well for novels, but I don't like such places and go there only when ordered. “Report to General Meade,” said Hancock, “that it is very hard to bring up troops in this wood, and that only a part of my Corps is up, but I will do as well as I can.” Up rides an officer: “Sir! General Getty is hard pressed and nearly out of ammunition!” “Tell him to hold on and General Gibbon will be up to help him.” Another officer: “General Mott's division has broken, sir, and is coming back.” “Tell him to stop them, sir!!” roared Hancock in a voice of a trumpet. As he spoke, a crowd of troops came from the woods and fell back into the Brock road. Hancock dashed among them. “Halt here! halt here! Form behind this rifle-pit. Major Mitchell, go to Gibbon and tell him to come up on the double-quick!” It was a welcome sight to see Carroll's brigade coming along that Brock road, he riding at their head as calm as a May morning. “Left face — prime — forward,” and the line disappeared in the woods to waken the musketry with double violence. Carroll was brought back wounded. Up came Hays's brigade, disappeared in the woods, and, in a few minutes, General Hays was carried past me, covered with blood, shot through the head.
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1 Of this incident Lyman writes in his journal: "2.45. Griffin comes in, followed by his mustering officer, Geo. Barnard. He is stern and angry. Says in a loud voice that he drove back the enemy, Ewell, ¾ of a mile, but got no support on the flanks, and had to retreat — the regulars much cut up. Implies censure on Wright, and apparently also on his corps commander, Warren. Wadsworth also driven back. Rawlins got very angry, considered the language mutinous, and wished him put in arrest. Grant seemed of the same mind and asked Meade: ‘Who is this General Gregg? You ought to arrest him!’ Meade said: ‘It's Griffin, not Gregg; and it's only his way of talking.’”

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 85-91