AUGUSTA, GA., December 6, 1864.
His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President of the Confederate States:
SIR: Your letter of the 30th ultimo, acknowledging the
receipt of my telegram of 24th of November, was received by me on the road from
Macon to this place. With the limited reliable means at our command I believe
that all that could be has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose
the advance of Sherman's forces toward the Atlantic coast. That we have not
thus far been more successful none can regret more than myself, but he will
doubtless be prevented from capturing Augusta, Charleston, and Savannah, and he
may yet be made to experience serious loss before reaching the coast.
On the 16th of November, when about leaving Tuscumbia, Ala.,
on a tour of inspection to Corinth, Miss., I was informed by General Hood of
the report just received by him that Sherman would probably move from Atlanta
into Georgia I instructed him at once to repeat his orders to General Wheeler
to watch closely Sherman's movements, and should he move as reported, to attack
and harass him at all favorable points. I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General
Taylor, at Selma, Ala, to call on Governor Watts, of Alabama, and Governor
Clark, of Mississippi, for all the State troops that they could furnish, and
with all the available movable forces of his department to keep himself in
readiness to move at a moment's notice to the assistance of Maj. Gens. Howell
Cobb and G. W. Smith, who were then at or about Griffin, Ga., threatening
Atlanta. I also telegraphed to General Cobb to call upon Governor Brown, of
Georgia, and Governor Bonham, of South Carolina, for all the State troops that
could be collected. I made all necessary preparations to repair forthwith to
Georgia in the event of Sherman's executing his reported movement.
On my arrival at Corinth, on the 18th of November, having been
informed that Sherman had commenced his movement, I issued all necessary orders
to meet the emergency, including an order to General Hood to send one division
of cavalry (Jackson's) to re-enforce Wheeler, but this order was suspended by
him, his objection being that his cavalry could not be reduced without
endangering the success of his campaign in Tennessee, and that General Wheeler
already had thirteen brigades under his command. I finally instructed him to
send only one brigade, if he contemplated taking the offensive at once, as had
already been decided upon. I then left Corinth for Macon, where I arrived on
24th of November.
I did not countermand the campaign into Tennessee to pursue
Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:
First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa
Rivers across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy
rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and wagon trains.
Second. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had
already the start of about 275 miles, on comparatively good roads. The transfer
of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway
than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably
resulting from the condition of the railroads.
Third. To pursue Sherman the passage of the Army of
Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges
destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or
forage, and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part
would seriously deplete the army by desertions.
Fourth. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army
of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman would have opened to Thomas' forces the
richest portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the
capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of
Sherman.
Fifth. In October last, when passing through Georgia to
assume command of the Military Division of the West, I was informed by Governor
Brown that he could probably raise, in case of necessity, about 6,000 men,
which I supposed might be doubled in a levy en masse. General Cobb
informed me, at the same time, that at Augusta, Macon, and Columbus he had
about 6,500 local troops, and that he hoped shortly to have collected at his
reserve and convalescent camps near Macon 2,500 more. Of these 9,000 men he
supposed about one-half, or 5,000, could be made available as movable troops
for an emergency.
To oppose the advance of the enemy from Atlanta the State of
Georgia would thus have probably 17,000 men, to which number must be added the
thirteen brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, amounting to about 7,000 men. The
troops which could have been collected from Savannah, South Carolina, and North
Carolina before Sherman's forces could reach the Atlantic coast would have
amounted, it was supposed, to about 5,000 men.
Thus it was a reasonable supposition that about 29,000 or
30,000 men could be collected in time to defend the State of Georgia and insure
the destruction of Sherman's army, estimated by me at about 36,000 effectives
of all arms, their cavalry, about 4,000 strong, being included in this
estimate.
Under these circumstances, after consultation with General
Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into
Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas' army, and such other
forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he
reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense
of Kentucky, and perhaps Ohio, and thus prevent him from re-enforcing Grant.
Meanwhile supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee,
thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited
resources.
I remain, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
44 (Serial No. 92), p. 931-3; John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat,
p. 278-80
